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Long-run e↵ects of austerity∗
Guilherme Klein Martins†
November 30, 2022

Abstract
This paper provides evidence that austerity shocks have long-run negative e↵ects on
GDP. Besides addressing the important gap in the growing fiscal research regarding the
short time horizon of the estimations, this paper analyzes two other important assumptions
made in the literature regarding the (i) symmetry of episodes of fiscal expansion and contraction and (ii) uniformity of fiscal multipliers for di↵erent sizes of shocks. We use narrative
fiscal shocks and propensity score reweighting in a local projections setup to account for the
potential endogeneity of austerity policies and the non-linearity of its e↵ects over time. The
estimation is also adapted to eliminate the bias that emerges when multiple shocks might occur within the time horizon of interest. Our baseline results show that contractionary fiscal
shocks larger than 1.5% of GDP generate a negative e↵ect of more than 3% on GDP even after 15 years. The drop in GDP reaches 5.5% for fiscal contractions larger than 3%. Evidence
is also found linking austerity with smaller capital stock in the long-run. The results are
robust to di↵erent fiscal shocks datasets, the exclusion of particular countries and shocks,
alternative estimation methods, and the use of cleaner controls. Besides understanding the
consequences of this particular policy, the results contribute to the broader discussion on
the long-run e↵ects of demand by suggesting that such shocks might permanently a↵ect the
economy.
JEL codes: C54, E62, H5, H2
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(...) macroeconomics in this original sense has succeeded: Its central problem of depression
prevention has been solved, for all practical purpose (...) the potential for welfare gains from
better long-run, supply-side policies exceeds by far the potential from further improvements in
short-run demand management.
Lucas Jr (2003)
This post-crisis experience suggests that changes in aggregate demand may have an appreciable, persistent e↵ect on aggregate supply - that is, on potential output.
Yellen (2016)
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Introduction

In August 2022, Greece exited the European Union’s ‘enhanced surveillance’, a framework
established to ensure the policies implemented in the country from 2010 would not be reversed.
These measures, aimed at decreasing public indebtedness, included large cuts to public spending,
privatizations, and tax increases. After 12 years of its implementation, it is not clear how
successful the strategy was. Greece’s general government debt went from 130% of GDP in 2010
to 224% in 2021, while the average of OECD countries went from 70% to 94.7%. Greek real GDP
per capita in 2021 is still 12.7% lower than in 2010, while the European Union (EU) expanded
12.1%.1 The labor market was also impacted significantly: while the EU had an increase of
3.5% in its labor force, Greece had a reduction of 8.4%. Moreover, long-term unemployment2
increased by more than 41% in the country between 2010 and 2021, while it fell by 7% in OECD.
However, it is clear that to evaluate the success of the austerity strategy it is not sufficient
to compare averages. Ideally, one would have to compare Greece’s performance in the period
to what would have happened if di↵erent policies had been implemented. Moreover, to take
more general conclusions that can inform policy, it is also relevant to understand the timing of
e↵ects; that is, how much of the decrease in GDP in 2021 is related to the austerity implemented
in 2017 and how much to the policies applied still in 2010, for instance. Such analysis of the
long-run e↵ects of austerity, however, is nonexistent in the literature, despite being central to
the discussion that dominated economic and policy debates in recent decades. This paper seeks
to fill this gap.
1

Data from the World Bank. Calculated at 2015 constant US dolars.
As a share of total unemployment. Long-term unemployment defined as unemployment by more than one
year
2
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In di↵erent moments in the past 15 years, due to economic crises, such as the financial
in 2007, the debt one in the Eurozone, and the Covid pandemic, or by broader theoretical
reasons, such as the discussions of a ‘secular stagnation’ and a zero-lower bond for monetary
policy, more aggressive fiscal policy has been brought to the fore. This movement has also been
accompanied by a ‘renaissance in fiscal research’, as pointed out by V. Ramey (2019), which
led to a significant improvement in our knowledge about the topic. The literature, however,
focuses on (i) the short and medium-runs e↵ects3 of (ii) fiscal shocks in general.
There might be di↵erent reasons for the shorter-run focus. V. Ramey (ibid.) points to
methodological issues, arguing that the methods to estimate long-run e↵ects would be di↵erent
than those commonly employed in the fiscal literature. Another potential explanation is the
theoretical understanding that demand shocks have only short-term e↵ects, with supply-side
factors determining the long-run. Both arguments, however, should not prevent an interest in
estimating the long-run e↵ects of these shocks. First, there are now methods widely used in
the literature to estimate the e↵ects of similar shocks over extended time horizons. Second,
although the idea of neutrality of demand in the long-run is still important, there has been
growing interest in recent years in the long-term e↵ects of shocks, particularly negative ones
related, for instance, to political, banking, or financial crises (e.g., Yellen (2016) and Blanchard,
Cerutti, et al. (2015)). By estimating the long-run e↵ects of fiscal shocks, one can also contribute
to this emerging literature on the persistence of demand shocks.
Not least important is the fact that the literature tends to analyze the e↵ects of fiscal shocks
in general, and not of austerity policies. This is not only an important gap but, not rarely, a
source of misunderstanding as the estimated e↵ects of fiscal shocks in general are implied to
hold for austerity measures in particular. Due to its deep implications on social and political
spheres, economists’ use of the term should dialogue with other areas of knowledge and the
broader public, for which austerity tends to mean ‘enforced or extreme economy especially on
a national scale’, as defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary. Less anecdotally and without
resorting to other fields, this is also recognized by Alesina, Favero, et al. (2019a): “[t]he term
“austerity” indicates a policy of sizeable reduction of government deficits and stabilization of
3
This might be a too general statement, but exceptions seem to be extremely rare indeed. One that could
be cited is Fatás and Summers (2018), that look exclusively to consolidations that took place in 2010-2011 and
whose estimations are completely based on forecasts, both for GDP (up to 2021) and for the structural balance.
Although informative, these estimations seem to be significantly less robust than those that take into account a
much larger number of shocks, use methods to achieve shocks that are as exogenous as, arguably, possible, and
that do not rely on forecast errors, for instance.
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government debt achieved by means of spending cuts or tax increases, or both.” (p.1, italics
added). The literature, however, with very few exceptions,4 ignores this definition in two
important ways by assuming that (i) fiscal contractions and expansions are symmetrical, and
(ii) that the e↵ects are linear on the size of the shock.5
There are multiple theoretical reasons why these two aspects might be relevant. The recognition that positive and negative demand shocks tend to have asymmetrical e↵ects is not new
(e.g., De Long et al. (1988), Cover (1992)). There are di↵erent channels through which this
could operate. The economy can have multiple equilibriums6 , with positive and negative shocks
pushing the economy to di↵erent ‘steady-states’. Another channel is more explicit in efficiency
wages models (e.g., Summers (1988)), in which workers quickly adjust their wage expectations
upwards after a positive shock but do not do so following a negative one; the validity of this
channel is reinforced by research on behavioral economics, for instance regarding self-serving
biases (Babcock and Loewenstein (1997)) and money illusion (Fehr and Tyran (2001)). The
e↵ects might be asymmetrical also due to di↵erent reactions of the financial market: as in
Greenwald et al. (1988), banks can either remain healthy - the probable outcome of a positive
shock -, or fail - a possible result of negative shocks. While the first situation might not generate
permanent e↵ects, the second tends to do so.
Regarding heterogeneous e↵ects by the shock size, most of these reasons can also be important: shifts between equilibriums might depend on the size of the initial departure from
the former equilibrium; the cognitive costs related to operating with nominal or real values are
non-linear7 ; financial institutions are resilient to relatively small negative shocks. An additional
channel might be related to factor hoarding: in face of a small demand shock, output might
be adjusted via changes in capacity utilization and work intensity, while larger shocks tend to
generate modifications in investment plans and labor demand, with larger impacts on aggregate
demand. All these reasons might impact not only the proportional e↵ects (or multiplier, in a
more general usage of the term) of the shocks, but also their persistence over time.
Therefore, taking into consideration the direction and the size of the fiscal shock is important
4
Alesina and Ardagna (2010) is an important exception, as the authors calculate separatedly the e↵ects of
expansions and contractions using the CAPB method.
5
As will be resumed in section 2, in some sense the size of the shock is relevant for an important strand of the
literature, as in Alesina, Favero, et al. (2019b), in which the size matters as the average elasticity is calculated;
or in Alesina and Ardagna (2010), in which they declare a shock only changes in the adjusted primary balance
larger than 1.5% - in this case, again, however, it is only the average e↵ect that is calculated.
6
Due to increasing returns to scale, or asymmetric information, for instance.
7
Money illusion is more probable for relatively low levels of inflation.
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not only as a matter of following the definition of austerity, but also because there are multiple
theoretical reasons indicating that the e↵ects might not be symmetrical and proportional. A
more detailed description of such theoretical reasons is beyond the scope of the paper. The
discussion of how the empirical literature deals with these dimensions is resumed in section 2.
This paper aims to fill this important gap in the literature by estimating the e↵ects of
austerity - understood as contractionary fiscal shocks of significant magnitude - over a time
horizon of 15 years. Results indicate that sufficiently large shocks (more than 1.5% of GDP in
the baseline case and 1% of GDP in robustness exercises) generate a significant and persistent
reduction in GDP even after 15 years; this result is robust to the use of alternative datasets
(both of extended GDP and austerity shocks), the exclusion of countries and episodes, and the
implementation of di↵erent estimation methods. There is also evidence that short- and longrun multipliers are di↵erent for relatively small and large shocks. We also find indications that
spending cuts generate larger negative e↵ects on GDP, and that austerity shocks are associated
with lower capital stock.
Besides this introduction, the paper has three other parts. In section 2, we present the
current research on fiscal shocks to locate this paper in the broad literature and introduce, by
comparisons, the methodology used in the empirical estimations. Section 3 explains the method
and data in more detail and presents our baseline estimations. It is followed by section 4, in
which a series of robustness checks and extensions are performed. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2

Fiscal Research

To help organize the literature, one can point, in line with V. Ramey (2019), to the three
main methods used in empirical fiscal research: i) aggregate country-level time series or panel
estimates, ii) estimated or calibrated New Keynesian DSGE models, and iii) ‘natural experiment
approaches’ that use, for instance, variations in sub-national units for identification.8 Each of
those has its weaknesses: time series methods require exogenous variation in policy, which
sometimes forces the use of inadequate instruments;9 estimations based on DSGE models, on
8
Using war-induced government spending for identification can also be fitted in this category; however, this
method does not apply well to other countries with lower defense spending or for those that the fluctuations are
associated with conflict within the country.
9
That are either exogenous but not very relevant (have a low correlation to the fiscal variable) or relevant but
not exogenous or unanticipated. An example of the first type is military news, which are weak instruments after
1954 (V. A. Ramey (2011)); an example of the latter is the one-step ahead forecast error of government spending,
used in Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
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their part, rely on strong assumptions about the generating process of unobserved shocks and
the theoretical structure. Moreover, subnational analyses do not lead directly to macroeconomic
estimations, also requiring some theoretical model to do this passage.
All considered, the literature, following e↵orts to improve the main weakness of the method
and capture shocks that are as exogenous as possible, has been converging to the use of countrylevel data of exogenous policy changes. A traditional method in the literature is the cyclically
adjusted primary balance (CAPB) method (e.g., Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Alesina and
Ardagna (2010)). The idea is that, by calculating how much the components of the government
budget change along the economic cycle, one can net this e↵ect from actual government primary
balance and thus check if the public sector is acting with a positive, negative, or neutral impulse
in the economy.
This method has received multiple criticisms. C. Romer and D. Romer (2010) point out that
CAPB is a↵ected by nonpolicy changes that might be correlated with other elements a↵ecting
output10 . Another argument, which goes to the heart of the endogeneity concern, is that even
if the CAPB method correctly indicates a discretionary policy change, its motivation might be
related to cyclical fluctuations: governments might cut spending if inflation is increasing; social
expenditure tends to increase in recessions, and so on (e.g., Devries et al. (2011); Ball et al.
(2013)). Caveats can also be made on the subjectivity of the method to extract the economic
cycle out of data (and how estimations tend to be sensitive to this choice), as well as the usual
assumption of a constant elasticity of expenditure to the economic cycle (e.g., C. Romer and
D. Romer (2010); Agnello and Sousa (2014)).
An alternative to CAPB11 that recently gained ground is the ‘narrative approach’. This
method tries to look directly at exogenous fiscal shocks, that is, changes in government expenditure or revenue that are not related to the business cycle. In the most recent and consolidated
datasets, these shocks are identified by the analysis of official documents (congressional debates,
speeches, budget documents, etc.) and consider as exogenous the changes motivated by the goal
of increasing long-run growth or reducing the budget deficit.12
10
An example given by the authors (a similar argument is made by David and Leigh (2018)) is a stock market
boom that raises cyclically adjusted revenues due to capital gains realizations but also correlates with other
elements in the economy that will generate a future increase in output.
11
There are other procedures that are similar in spirit to CAPB. Mountford and Uhlig (2009), for instance,
main identification strategy using VARs is imposing sign restrictions: for instance, the impulse response function
of the government revenue (spending) will be positive for four quarters following a positive shock of the same
variable and, even more important, that the shock is orthogonal to the business cycle and monetary policy.
12
Another implementation adopted by the literature with this method is to look at military spending related
to foreign conflicts (e.g., V. Ramey and Shapiro (1998)).
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This method is increasingly recognized as an important step in improving estimations based
on panel data. However, it is also not exempt from criticism. Jordà and Taylor (2016) show
that the time of fiscal shocks in the IMF fiscal narrative dataset (Devries et al. (2011)) can
be predicted by some state variables - for instance, fiscal consolidations are more likely when
public debt to GDP is high and when GDP growth is below potential. They propose using a
propensity weighting strategy to further improve the identification of fiscal shocks: a higher
weight is given to countries that, although having a higher probability of having a shock, do not
have one. At the current stage of the literature, this combination of narrative fiscal shocks and
propensity weighting seems to be the best strategy to analyze fiscal shocks, and is, therefore,
the one employed in this paper. More details of the method will be presented in section 3.
In terms of methods to get impulse response functions of the output after the fiscal shocks,
there are two main alternatives in the literature. The one used in this paper is based on Local
Projections (Jordà (2005)), which has the advantage of not requiring the assumption of any
particular functional form.13 An alternative econometric method that is also widely used is
Vector Autoregressions (VARs); it requires, however, the assumption of a model and, although
generating a smaller variance, it tends to produce a more biased estimation, increasingly so for
long horizons (Li et al. (2022); Jordà, Singh, et al. (2020)).14
After this brief overview of the state of the literature, we can return to the observation by V.
Ramey (2019), mentioned in section 1, that the long-run e↵ects of fiscal shocks are not estimated
due to methodological limitations. Semi-parametric methods have been used in estimations with
similar setups over long time horizons. Jordà, Singh, et al. (2020) use local projections with
instrumental variables to calculate the e↵ects of monetary shocks over 12 years, and Acemoglu et
al. (2019) implement local projections with di↵erent propensity weighting methods to estimate
the e↵ects of democracy on a thirty-years horizon, to name a couple. Therefore, it is not unusual
in recent research to use the methods implemented here to calculate long-run e↵ects of similar
13
Jordà and Taylor (2016) argue that the method also provides better control for observable variables and is
more reliable when the instrumental variables (for the fiscal shocks) themselves might be endogenous.
14
V. A. Ramey and Zubairy (2018) use the paper of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b) to exemplify other
di↵erences between using local projections (LP) and VARs in those estimations, particularly in the context of
estimating the e↵ects of fiscal changes based on di↵erent states of the economy. With the Jordà method (Jordà
(2005)), the transition between states (booms and recessions, for instance) appears directly if it is caused by
the (average) shock or is captured by the other control variables. With regime-switching VAR models, as in
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b), ones has to make assumptions; in this case, about when the parameters
should switch between states (they assume that economic states last for at least 20 quarters). In their subsequent
work, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a) perform a very similar exercise, but using local projections instead
of structural vector autoregression due to the advantage mentioned above, but also because local projections tend
to facilitate the correction of errors correlation within countries and it does no constrain the shape of the IRF.
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shocks. Additionally, in this paper, we adapt our estimations to account for a potential bias that
emerges when multiple shocks occur within the forecasted horizon. Following the suggestion
by Teulings and Zubanov (2014), this consists of controlling for a flexible number of treatment
leads in the local projections regressions. The econometric strategy is explained in more detail
in section 3.
As also indicated in section 1, another potential explanation for the lack of research on the
long-run e↵ects of fiscal shocks, however, is the theoretical understanding that demand shocks
only have short-run e↵ects, with supply determining the long-run. This view has prevailed in
economic theory (Yellen (2016)), from ’standard’ growth models, such as Solow (1956), to both
new classical (and real business cycle) and most of the new Keynesian models, and has largely
informed macroeconomic empirical research.15 In recent years a number of papers resumed
the discussion about the long-term e↵ects of negative shocks, but most focus on the e↵ects of
political, banking, or financial crises, while others look at GDP and estimations of its trend to
identify recessions and analyze their e↵ects over time (Haltmaier (2013) over a 4-year horizon;
Cerra and Saxena (2008), Martin et al. (2015) and Blanchard, Cerutti, et al. (2015) over a
maximum horizon of 10 years are some examples). However, there are no such estimations
for fiscal shocks. Therefore, by estimating the long-run e↵ects of austerity, this paper also
contributes to the broader debate on the persistent e↵ects of demand shocks.
Table 1 lists some of the most influential papers in the fiscal research literature. The literature is vast, and the list is produced to include papers closer to ours in estimating shocks
using country-level data, but also to illustrate the diversity of empirical methods used. The
most obvious di↵erence between our estimation and the literature is, as addressed at length,
15

A classical example is Blanchard and Quah (1989).
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the maximum time horizon.16
Table 1: Selected studies of the e↵ect of fiscal shocks on GDP
Authors
Alesina, Favero, et al. (2019b)

Data

Identification

Method

Max. Horizon

16 OECD Countries

Narrative

VAR

Five years

Narrative

LP (AIPW)

Five years

15 OECD Countries

Narrative

LP

One year

1980-2009

(VAT changes)

17 OECD Countries

CAPB

2SLS and VAR

Five years

VAR

Five years

1978-2014
Jordà and Taylor (2016)

17 OECD Countries
1978-2009

Riera-Crichton et al. (2016)

Guajardo et al. (2014)

Ilzetzki et al. (2013)

Baum et al. (2012)

1978-2009

inst. by narrative

44 countries

CAPB

1960-2007

(Expenditure)

6 OECD Countries

CAPB

TVAR

Three years

US

CAPB

STVAR

Five years

1966-2009

inst. by forecast

US

Narrative (Tax)

OLS and VAR

Five years

Sign restriction

VAR

Six years

1965-2011
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b)

C. Romer and D. Romer (2010)

1947-2007
Mountford and Uhlig (2009)

US
1955-2000

Note: AIPW: Augmented Inverse Propensity Weighted Estimator; TVAR: Threshold Vector Autoregression. STVAR is an
extension of smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) models.

However, there is another important element that is common in these works and, as mentioned in section 1, is explored in this paper: the assumption of linearity of the e↵ect of fiscal
change. This assumption appears in two forms: that positive and negative shocks are taken to
be symmetrical, and that shocks of di↵erent sizes have the same proportional e↵ects. The symmetry assumption is explicit when the estimated e↵ect of a fiscal shock is the average (weighted
by the number of respective shocks) of the e↵ects of positive and (inverted) negative shocks.
Once one considers the theoretical reasons why the e↵ects might not be symmetrical, such as
the ones presented in section 1, it is clear how the assumption can be misleading. Assume, for
instance, that in a sample there is the same number of fiscal expansions and contractions, and,
to simplify, that the size of all shocks is 1% of GDP in absolute terms. Assume, finally, that the
average e↵ect of expansions is to increase GDP by 10% and contractions do not change GDP.
In this case, grouping all estimations, we would get the result that an increase (decrease) in the
16
In some of the papers, such as in Ilzetzki et al. (2013), a ‘long-run’ e↵ect is also calculated by assuming
time goes to infinite; in practice, this is equivalent to the e↵ect achieved with the convergence in the maximum
horizon.
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fiscal variable of 1% of GDP will increase (decrease) GDP by 5%. This, of course, is correct as
an average e↵ect. However, it obscures essential di↵erences between the two types of policies.
The assumption that shocks of di↵erent sizes have proportional e↵ects tends to be more
explicit in papers that use narrative fiscal shocks as the ‘treatment’ variable, given that not
rarely the independent variable is binary (fiscal shock or without fiscal shock), as in Jordà and
Taylor (2016). However, even in estimations with a ‘continuous’ treatment, that is, the size of
the shock as the independent variable17 , for instance, a limitation persists. First, because these
estimations would still capture the average size of the e↵ect, and, a priori, it is possible that
shocks of di↵erent sizes have di↵erent proportional e↵ects (or multipliers, in a more general use
of the term). The limitation of taking into account only the average e↵ects is highlighted in
a sample with a large number of small shocks, which is the case even for the most common
narrative fiscal shocks datasets.
Secondly, because in the particular discussions about austerity measures, to which many of
the papers listed participate, considering shocks of all sizes and assuming they have the same
elasticities is misleading. As indicated in the introduction (section 1), the term ‘austerity’ carries
a more or less specific meaning among economists and the general public, that of a significant
reduction in government primary balance, and, not rarely, a more specific understanding of
a reduction in public spending.18 It must be acknowledged that the literature, by analyzing
di↵erences in the shocks led by taxes or spending changes, advanced significantly in understanding this latter aspect of what is sometimes taken to be austerity shocks in the short-run. The
broader aspect related to the size of the shock, however, has not been explored yet.19
For these reasons, we believe that estimating separately the e↵ects of (i) only contractionary
shocks, and (ii) by di↵erent size brackets, is also an important contribution of this paper to the
17
Which is the norm in estimations using VARs, but can also be applied with other methods, such as the Local
Projections, as in Alesina, Favero, et al. (2019b) and Riera-Crichton et al. (2016).
18
Examples are abundant. In this article, for instance, it is suggested that tax increases would be required to
end austerity (that is, the reduction in public spending): https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/oct/04/isausterity-really-over-theresa-mays-promise-lacks-key-details. In this New York Times article, austerity is defined
as ”a campaign of budget cutting” (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/24/world/europe/britain-austerity-maybudget.html). In this UN report, austerity is also associated with spending cuts: ”austerity policies(...) eliminated
many social services, reduced policing services to skeletal proportions, closed libraries in record numbers, shrunk
community and youth centres, and sold o↵ public spaces and buildings including parks and recreation centres” (https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc4139add1-visit-united-kingdom-great-britainand-northern-ireland).
19
It must be noted also that some earlier works that used the CAPB method were closer to our claim that the
shock must be large enough to be considered an austerity shock. In Alesina and Ardagna (2010), for instance,
it was considered a shock if the CAPB changed by more than 1.5% of GDP. The goal of the threshold, however,
was to be sure one was capturing a shock and not to focus on large ones - it is relevant to note that the size of
the shocks captured by the CAPB method are significantly larger: 2.4% of GDP in Alesina and Ardagna (ibid.)
compared to 0.9% in Devries et al. (2011).
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literature.
In terms of the results, the literature is also heterogeneous, although there has been a
convergence in recent years towards the direction of the short-run e↵ects on GDP of fiscal
consolidations to be negative, with a larger multiplier for tax changes than spending (V. Ramey
(2019)). An important exception is a paper by Alesina and Ardagna (2010), which found
that negative fiscal shocks had a positive e↵ect on output in a three-year horizon, sparking
an intense discussion around the “expansionary austerity” hypothesis. The authors propose
a few channels through which the e↵ects could take place. On the demand side, if agents
believe that the shock prevents a much more disruptive adjustment in the future, it would
generate a positive wealth e↵ect, which might increase demand. Also, if agents believe the
adjustment is credible and avoids default, they would ask for lower premiums on government
bonds, reducing interest rates. On the supply side, the main channel would be via the labor
market. Expenditure cuts (in government jobs and wages, for instance) would worsen workers‘
fallback position, decreasing wages in the private sector, allegedly increasing profits, investment
and competitiveness. Increases in taxes, on the other side, would tend to increase the pretax
real wage, squeezing profits, investment and competitiveness.
However interesting these theoretical channels might be, most of the papers that followed
pointed in the opposite direction. Let us mention two that are closely related to ours. Jordà
and Taylor (2016) first replicate, using LP, the results of Alesina and Ardagna (2010), but, the
authors show that this result is driven entirely by the e↵ects of contractionary policies during
booms. The next step given by Jordà and Taylor (2016), and already mentioned, is to show
that narrative episodes are not good instruments as they are also endogenous.20 Given this, the
statistical design proposed by Jordà and Taylor (ibid.) is the following: i) use the consolidation
episodes identified in the IMF narrative dataset as the maximum subset of episodes (a ’pseudoIV’ step); ii) add the covariates that can predict the fiscal shock or influence output as controls;
and iii) use inverse propensity score weighting to re-randomize the allocation of the consolidation
episodes. With this setup, similar to the one employed in this paper, the authors find that
20
First, they indicate that for a number of variables (Public debt to GDP ratio, deviation of log output from
trend, output growth rate, and lagged value of treatment), the means are statistically di↵erent for ’treated’ and
control groups, indicating that the distribution of treatment is significantly di↵erent than an ideal randomised
controlled trial. The authors also find that other variables, usually omitted in the regressions that try to identify
the causal e↵ect of fiscal shocks on output, are significant in explaining GDP fluctuations in a regression that
also contains fiscal shocks (CAPB and its instrumentalized versions) as an independent variable. Finally, using
di↵erent binary classification models, they show that the occurrence of fiscal consolidations (as indicated by the
IMF narrative dataset) can be predicted by a number of variables (public debt to GDP ratio; the output gap;
GDP growth; and fiscal consolidation itself).
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consolidation episodes are associated with lower GDP within a five-year horizon.
Alesina, Favero, et al. (2019b) present the analysis21 of austerity plans in 16 OECD countries
from the 1970s to 2014 using the narrative approach by extending the dataset elaborated by
Devries et al. (2011). They use panel vector autoregression approach to analyze the e↵ect of
such plans on a 4-year time horizon. They argue that while austerity based on spending cuts
generates minor negative e↵ects and only in the first year, plans based on tax increases reduce
GDP by about 2% after four years.
Our paper can be placed within this large and emerging fiscal research literature. There
are a number of gaps and issues, however, that this work aims at addressing. The main one is
to examine the long-run e↵ects of austerity shocks, resorting to modifications in the estimation
method to account for particularities of the time horizon and the fact that multiple shocks occur
in the horizon of interest. Secondly, this paper does not assume, as the majority of the literature,
that positive and negative shocks are symmetrical. Finally, this paper does not assume that the
fiscal multiplier is the same regardless of the shock size, which is particularly relevant not only
to the conceptual discussion about austerity, but also because the shocks are “too common” in
the datasets, weakening identification.

3

Estimations

3.1

Baseline

As previously mentioned, despite its weakness, the narrative approach to identify fiscal shocks
has been recognized in the literature as the best option to deal with endogeneity. In this paper,
we use the dataset of narrative fiscal shocks compiled by Alesina, Azzalini, et al. (2018), which
is, to the best of our knowledge, the largest available, covering 16 OECD countries (Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States) from 1978 to 2014. The dataset
by Alesina, Azzalini, et al. (ibid.) takes Devries et al. (2011) as a starting point but has several
di↵erences. The most explicit ones are the extension of the dataset from 2007 to 2014, which is
particularly important given the number of austerity policies implemented in this period, and
the exclusion of the Netherlands from the sample. However, the changes are deeper, as the
authors re-classify the shocks based on the original sources and, thus, significant discrepancies
21

The analyzes is initially presented in Alesina, Favero, et al. (2019a).
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Table 2: Description of narrative fiscal shocks in Alesina, Azzalini, et al. (2018)

Total
Expansions
Contractions
Range of shocks
Avg. Size of Contraction

Any Size
232
9
223
10.0%
1.6%

>1% GDP
128
0
128
8.7%
2.5%

>2% GDP
69
0
69
7.7%
3.4%

>3% GDP
33
0
33
6.7%
4.4%

Note: Range of shocks is the di↵erence between the largest and smallest shock (in the case with
expansions, the largest expansion is considered the ‘smallest shock’).

in the size of the shocks are frequent, and it is not rare that episodes found in one sample are
not present in the other. Some basic descriptive statistics of the sample are displayed in table 2;
more than half of the contractionary shocks are smaller than 1% of GDP and only around 15%
is larger than 3% of GDP. As indicated before, we use only the negative shocks in the sample.
Alesina, Azzalini, et al. (2018) implement vector autoregressions to evaluate the e↵ects of
such shocks. For the reasons described in previous sections, we estimate the e↵ects using a
semi-parametric method. More specifically, we will use an extension of the Augmented Inverse
Propensity Weighted Estimator (AIPW). According to Lunceford and Davidian (2004) and
Jordà and Taylor (2016), the AIPW is the estimator with the smallest asymptotic variance
within the class of the double-robust estimators - that is, those for which it is sufficient that
either the conditional mean model (‘outcome model’) or the propensity score model (‘treatment
model’) to be correctly specified for the estimator to be consistent.
As indicated in section 2, the ‘treatment model’ is used to calculate the probability of each
unit (country-year) to have an austerity shock. The variables used in the probit to estimate this
probability are:22 country dummies23 , debt (% GDP), GDP gap (as measured by HP filter),
real GDP growth (current and one lag), a dummy for an episode of fiscal consolidation in the
previous year, long-term and short-term interest rates, current account (% GDP), change in the
investment to GDP ratio, real private loan growth, and CPI inflation rate. Except for the data
on the current account, which we extract from the OECD, and the one for real private loan
growth, obtained with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the source for the other
variables is the data employed by Alesina, Azzalini, et al. (2018).24 After the ‘preliminary’
22

As mentioned, this follows the procedure adopted by Jordà and Taylor (2016).
In the appendix, we also test the results including time dummies.
24
It can be found here: www.igier.unibocconi.it/fiscalplans. The GDP data is in volume at market prices. For
some data points, we had to make some minor adjustments. For 4 data points of indebtedness, we perform linear
interpolation (Belgium 1989, Denmark 1997, Sweden 2003, Finland 1980). Moreover, for Germany and Ireland
before 1990, we use the change in the correspondent variables of short and long-term interest rates in Jordà and
Taylor (ibid.) to extrapolate these variables; the same procedure was implemented for CPI inflation in England
before 1988 and for short-term interest rate from Sweden before 1982.
23
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stage of reweighting the sample, we can proceed to the ‘outcome model’, in which a regular
di↵erence-in-di↵erences regression is performed with controls for conditional mean. We follow
Jordà and Taylor (2016) and control for a cyclical component of GDP, country-fixed e↵ects,
and two lags of change in GDP.25
More specifically, the estimator can be written as:

X
ˆ hAIP W = 1
⇤
n t

⇢

Dt (yt+h
pˆt

yt )

(1

Dt )(yt+h
(1 p̂t )
(Dt
p̂t (1

yt )

p̂t ) h
(1
p̂t )

p̂t )mh1 (Xt , ✓ˆ1h ) + p̂t mh0 (Xt , ✓ˆ0h )

i

(1)

For which: yt+h is the variable of interest at time t + h, Dt is the fiscal policy variable, pˆt is
the policy propensity score at time t given the relevant set of covariates contained at Xt , and
mhj is a generic specification of the conditional mean of yt+h
with or without a shock). Finally, ✓ˆjh = (↵jh

h 0
j),

yt

in the subpopulation j (that is,

with ↵jh indicated what would be the size of

(yt+h

yt ) for group j in the absence of treatment and

(yt+h

yt ).

h
j

the estimator of the covariates over
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An important adjustment to this method is required. The main problem to be addressed
here is that in settings in which the “treatment” (austerity shocks) can occur multiple times,
it is possible that, when interested in the e↵ect of treatment at time t on (yt+h

yt ), another

treatment takes place between time t and time h. In those cases, the e↵ect of Dt+j for j < h
is absorbed by the fixed e↵ects coefficients of the regression, biasing the estimation of the
treatment itself. This problem increases with the forecasted horizon; thus, it is an important
problem for long-run estimations such as the ones performed in this paper. The solution,
proposed by Teulings and Zubanov (2014) and followed in this paper, is to include future fiscal
P
shocks occurring up to time h in the future ( hj=01 ⇤h Dt+h j ) as controls.
Figure 1 presents the main results of our estimations, namely the e↵ects on GDP of con-

tractionary fiscal shocks of di↵erent sizes. As can be seen, when all contractionary shocks are
considered, a negative e↵ect on GDP is present in most years, but in a statistically significant
way only in the fourth and fifth years after the shock. The results are di↵erent for larger shocks:
for those larger than 1.5% of GDP, the coefficients tend to be larger (in absolute terms) and
25

In appendix 6.1, we test with an additional lag of GDP change to address any concern with pre-trends.
In our baseline regressions, we will follow the assumption made in most macro estimations using VARs and
which is also performed by Jordà and Taylor (2016) (table 8) that ✓0h = ✓1h .
26
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more significant (statistically), including after 15 years, for which the coefficient is -3.5% of
GDP. When restricting the analysis to stronger shocks, larger than 3% of GDP, the coefficients
are even more negative and statistically significant for every year; those shocks are associated
with a reduction in GDP of 5.6% after 15 years.27 In other words, our estimations suggest
that relatively large contractionary fiscal shocks generate significant long-run negative e↵ects
on GDP.
It can be argued that the choice for the thresholds for the minimum size of the shock is
somehow subjective. The choice of 1.5% (and its multipliers) of GDP as the baseline follows the
threshold adopted in some papers to establish the minimum size of the change in the cyclically
adjusted primary balance for a fiscal shock (Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alesina and Ardagna
(2010)). To reduce concerns that these choices are driving our results, we test other minimum
thresholds in the robustness section (subsection 4.1).
Figure 1: E↵ect of Austerity - By size of the shock
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Note: Dots indicate estimated coefficients. The bars indicate a 90% confidence interval.

It is important to note that the narrative fiscal data from Alesina, Azzalini, et al. (2018)
considers fiscal plans and divides the austerity measures into three categories: (i) shocks that
took place in time t and were not previously announced; (ii) measures that take place in time t
27

These results do not tell us nothing about di↵erent proportional e↵ects of the shocks; we explore this issue
in the next section (subsection 4.4).

15

and that were announced in the past; and (iii) measures announced in time t to be implemented
in t+1. In line with the authors’ use of their dataset in Alesina, Azzalini, et al. (2018)28 , the size
of a shock in time t is assumed to be the sum of all three categories. In the appendix (section
6.4), we also add robustness exercises of estimations that use only actual shocks (anticipated
or not) and the results of negative e↵ects in the long-run persist for shocks larger than 3% of
GDP, with even larger negative e↵ects after 15 years.
An important discussion in the literature is whether austerity policies based on expenditure
reduction have the same e↵ects as those implemented via tax increases. In figure 2, we explore
the question by looking at each type of policy. There are di↵erent ways of defining each of these
shocks; in the baseline specification used here, we consider all tax or expenditure shocks - a
usual alternative in the literature is to consider a tax or expenditure shock if the larger part
of the austerity measure is based on it. While tax increases do not generate any significant
change in GDP, reductions in government expenditure tend to significantly decrease GDP over
extended periods. The result that spending cuts harm GDP more than tax increases is also
robust to the use of only actual shocks that take place in time t, as can be seen in the appendix.
Hence, spending-based fiscal shocks seem to be responsible for the significant negative longrun e↵ect of austerity found in our overall estimations. This result di↵ers from the majority
obtained in the fiscal multiplier literature that uses time-series data, as summarized by V.
Ramey (2019). These papers frequently find a larger negative multiplier (for up to five years)
for tax increases than for spending cuts. E↵ects estimated by calibrated DSGE models are, in
general, more in line with the results found here.
28
See, for instance, the discussion in p. 149 about expenditure vs. tax based shocks. This is also described in
the book Alesina, Favero, et al. (2019a).
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Figure 2: Type of shock
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Note: Dots indicate estimated coefficients. The bars indicate a 95% confidence interval.

3.2

Extended dataset and di↵erent GDP measure

The discussion regarding austerity regained centrality after the great financial crisis of 2007
and its repercussions in the European debt crises some years later. This period was marked
by countries adopting fiscal austerity measures with the goals of controlling indebtedness and
increasing GDP growth, which could be directly connected due to a “debt intolerance” (Reinhart and Rogo↵ (2010)) or the channels indicated by the “expansionary austerity” hypothesis
presented before.
Given that our series goes up to 2014, an important limitation of the estimations is the
exclusion of the long-run e↵ects of this recent wave of austerity. A simple solution would be to
extend the data on GDP; in our baseline specification, however, there is an additional problem:
we are controlling for shocks occurring between t and t + h. Therefore, we would also need to
extend the fiscal shock data. Given the nonexistence of a longer narrative dataset, we perform
an intermediate solution: while we keep using the same narrative shocks as treatments, we
extend the series of shocks to be used as controls with a measure of fiscal shock based on
the cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB) calculated by the IMF. Following the usual
procedure in the literature, we look at the annual change in the CAPB and assume that a shock
17

occurs when the CAPB increases by at least 1.5% as a percentage of GDP. Finally, to generate
a series for GDP up to 2019 - and to take into account there might have been revisions in the
growth rates since the data was compiled by Alesina, Favero, et al. (2019a) - we use data from
OECD on the growth rate of GDP (in volume). As a robustness test, available in the appendix,
we perform the same estimation using GDP at constant national prices, from PWT 10.0; the
results are very similar.
As can be seen in figure 3, qualitative results persist: for a sufficiently large austerity shock,
there are statistically significant long-run e↵ects on GDP.

29

Figure 3: Extension - Alesina, Azzalini, et al. (2018)
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Note: Dots indicate estimated coefficients. The bars indicate a 95% confidence interval.

4
4.1

Extensions and Robustness
Alternative thresholds

As indicated above, the choice of 1.5% of GDP as our baseline threshold is based on other
important papers in the literature. However, it is clear that if the results are too sensitive to
this threshold, the generality of our argument - that austerity shocks, understood as significantly
29
We do not calculate the e↵ect by type of austerity with this extended dataset as the measure of CAPB that
we am using do not discriminate between tax and expenditure changes; therefore, its use, even only as a control
and for a short period of time would not be adequate.
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large negative fiscal shocks, have long-run e↵ects - is weakened. To address this, we test the
e↵ect on GDP after 15 years of shocks considering four other thresholds. Figure 4.1 indicates
that shocks larger than 1%, 2%, and 2.5% of GDP - besides the baseline cases of 1.5% and 3%
- have long-run e↵ects on GDP.
Figure 4: Alternative thresholds
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Note: Dots indicate estimated coefficients. The bars indicate a 90% confidence interval.

4.2

Alternative dataset

Another important dataset of narrative fiscal shocks is the one from Devries et al. (2011), which
covers 17 OECD countries from 1978 to 2007. As mentioned before, this dataset has several
di↵erences with respect to the one elaborated by Alesina, Favero, et al. (2019a) even for the
years covered by both, and it excludes this most recent wave of austerity plans after the Global
Financial Crisis. Thus, checking if the e↵ects of this alternative sample of shocks align with our
baseline results can serve as an important robustness check.
Applying our baseline estimation strategy and taking advantage that this is also the method
implemented by Jordà and Taylor (2016), we employ the same data used by them to calculate
the probability of being “treated”.30 Only the dummy for an episode of fiscal consolidation in
30
As indicated in section 3, the variables are: country dummies, debt (% GDP), GDP gap (as measured by
HP filter), real GDP growth (current and one lag), long-term and short-term interest rates, current account (%
GDP), change in the investment to GDP ratio, real private loan growth, CPI inflation rate, and a dummy for an
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the previous year is slightly di↵erent from the one of Jordà and Taylor (2016), as they use a
treatment variable that also includes fiscal expansions.31
Figure 5 presents our results, which are very similar to the ones from Jordà and Taylor
(ibid.) for short-run periods and considering all negative fiscal shocks, but for horizons longer
than those estimated by the authors, the results are statistically insignificant. However, once
again, when the shock size is taken into account, the results indicate something di↵erent. Using
again our baseline threshold of shocks larger than 1.5% of GDP, the negative e↵ect on GDP is
statistically significant in all years after the shock with the exception of the eighth year.
Figure 5: E↵ect by shock size - alternative dataset
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Note: Dots indicate estimated coefficients. The bars indicate a 90% confidence interval.

The narrative shocks in the Devries et al. (2011) dataset tend to be smaller than the ones
in Alesina, Favero, et al. (2019a), and thus there are not enough observations to perform the
estimations for shocks larger than 3% of GDP. In figure 6, we apply the same reasoning used
in section 4.1 and get a qualitatively similar result indicating that our findings regarding the
episode of fiscal consolidation in the previous year.
31
There seems to be a problem in Jordà and Taylor (2016) as it is not the case that the authors are assuming
that expansions and contractions are symmetrical, but instead, in their regressions, expansions are entering as
contractions - that is, the dummy of treatment takes 1 for both expansions and contractions. That ends up being
a minor problem in practical terms given that the number of expansions is very small. However, there are some
di↵erences if the estimation is adjusted to contain only contractions: the e↵ect after 5 years, in the restricted
case (table 8), drops to -0.9% and is significant only at 10%, while in Jordà and Taylor (ibid.), the e↵ect is of
-1.1% and significant at 5%.
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long-run e↵ects of austerity shocks are robust to di↵erent thresholds for the minimum size of
the shocks.
Figure 6: E↵ect by shock size - alternative dataset and thresholds
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Note: Dots indicate estimated coefficients. The bars indicate a 90% confidence interval.

Still using the data employed by Devries et al. (2011), one can check if the results by the
type of shock also hold. Figure 7 indicates that, although expenditure cuts tend to have a more
negative e↵ect in the long-run, the coefficients are consistently statistically non-significant at
10% eleven years after the shock.
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Figure 7: E↵ect by type of shock - alternative dataset
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Note: Dots indicate estimated coefficients. The bars indicate a 90% confidence interval.

4.3

Excluding episodes and countries

As indicated in table 2, there is a wide spectrum of shock sizes, this being one of the key venues
of exploration in our paper. However, given that we are placing only a lower limit to the shocks,
particularly large austerity measures may be driving our results. To test the robustness of our
results to this possibility, we re-run the baseline estimation for shocks larger than three percent
of GDP excluding one episode at a time and check if the e↵ects on GDP after fifteen years hold.
Figure 8 shows that the results are robust to the exclusion of any particular shocks.
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Figure 8: Robustness check - Excluding shocks (Larger than 3% of GDP)
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The same exercise is performed for the types of shocks. As can be seen in figure 9, the
result that increases in taxes are not associated with a change in GDP is consistent with the
exclusion of any particular shock. For the case of spending, all estimations indicate a large
negative coefficient, although the exclusion of three particular shocks decreases the statistical
significance - in two of them, notwithstanding, it remains significant at 90%.
Figure 9: Robustness check - Excluding shocks - Type
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Note: Dots indicate estimated coefficients. The bars indicate a 95% confidence interval.

A final exercise excludes entire countries of the sample. One reason for this exercise is
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the exclusion of a larger group of observations at each time (compared with the exclusion of
particular shocks). Another is that it is possible that for some countries the shocks have a
larger degree of endogeneity: for instance, contrary to Devries et al. (2011), Alesina, Favero,
et al. (2019a) exclude the Netherlands from their sample given that the fiscal rule of the country
leads to a particularly large correlation between fiscal adjustments and past output growth. As
can be seen in figure 10, the e↵ects by size and type of shock are very similar to the baseline
estimation, with austerity measures larger than 1.5% and 3% of GDP having a negative and
statistically significant e↵ect after 15 years in the vast majority of cases, as well as the e↵ect of
expenditure cuts in contrast to increases in taxes.
Figure 10: Robustness check - Excluding countries
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4.4

Continuous treatment

A question that might be of interest is if the proportional e↵ects of the shocks of di↵erent sizes
are also relevant. That is, if a shock 1% larger (as a % of GDP) has a di↵erent e↵ect considering
all the shocks and only those larger than 3%, for instance. This estimate gives us something
similar to a fiscal multiplier. To test this, we resort to an adaptation of our baseline method.
First, in our ‘ treatment model’, we re-weight the sample the same way did before, using a
binary treatment variable. In our ‘outcome’ model, however, we use a continuous treatment,
that is, the size of the shock.32 This is performed within each treatment band of interest of our
baseline estimation: all contractionary shocks, and those larger than 1.5% and 3% of GDP.
Table 3 presents the results for the instantaneous and long-run ‘multipliers’. The long-run
coefficients indicate, for example, that a shock of 2% of GDP will reduce GDP in around 3%
32

For the treatment itself and for its leads.
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Table 3: ‘Multipliers’ - by size shock
>0% GDP >1.5% GDP
Instantaneous (after 1 year)
Multiplier
-0.07
-0.24
P-value = >0% GDP
0.00
Long-run (after 15 years)
Multiplier
-0.51
-1.46
P-value = >0% GDP
0.00

>3% GDP
-0.23
0.02
-1.45+
0.03

Note:A qui-square test is used to test the null hypothesis that the multiplier is equal
to the one when all contractionary shocks are considered. + indicates statistical
significance at 10% ).

after 15 years. One interesting result is that the multipliers for shocks larger than 1.5% and
3% of GDP are very similar in both short- and long-runs. However, the most important result
is that the multipliers for these sufficiently large shocks are significantly di↵erent than the one
when considering all fiscal contractions; using a qui-square test, we can reject the hypothesis
that they are statistically equal with a 5% significance level. This reinforces the idea that
the size of the shock matters, not only due to persistence issues, as indicated in our baseline
estimations, but also for potential non-linear proportional e↵ects on the economy.

4.5

Initial examination of channels

A detailed examination of the channels through which these long-run e↵ects operate is beyond
the scope of this paper. Taking advantage of readily available data, however, we perform a first
approximation to check the e↵ects on the two main aggregate inputs: capital stock and labor.
Figure 11 suggests that austerity shocks larger than 1% of GDP (using our baseline dataset) are
associated with a consistent and statistically significant negative e↵ect on the stock of capital
(as measured by the PWT 10.0).
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Figure 11: E↵ect by size - Stock of Capital
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Note: Dots indicate estimated coefficients. The bars indicate a 95% confidence interval.

The e↵ects on the labor market are less clear: in figure 12, larger shocks seem associated
with a decrease in the ratio of the employed populated (also calculated based on PWT 10.0
data). This measure, although with advantages in some dimensions (do not rely on di↵erent
definitions of unemployment and incorporate changes in the population actively searching for
work, for instance), also has clear drawbacks, such as a change in demographics over fifteen years.
Moreover, results for other measures, such as the short and long-run unemployment rates and
the labor force participation as measured by the OECD, as presented in the appendix, do not
present a clear picture.
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Figure 12: E↵ect by size - Employed population
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Note: Dots indicate estimated coefficients. The bars indicate a 95% confidence interval.

4.6

Simpler Di↵erence-in-Di↵erences method

Another relevant exercise is to check if the results are too sensitive to our method. On the
one hand, the baseline method is chosen as it is the most appropriate to estimate the e↵ects of
interest here, given the arguments presented in section 2. In this sense, it is expected that the
estimated e↵ects depend on the method. On the other hand, if the results are reverted with the
use of other methods, although the baseline results should not be discarded, one would need
to analyze in greater detail the assumptions made in our baseline method and why the results
di↵er.
In this subsection, thus, we perform the analysis with a simpler estimation: instead of
weighting the sample using IPW, we control for all the variables in a standard di↵erence-indi↵erences setup:
yi,t+h = ↵i +

s

Ei,t + ✓Xi,t + ✏i,t+h

(2)

where ↵i are country dummies and X, a vector with all the control variables, including those
used in both the “treatment” and ”outcome” models in the AIPW estimator33 .
33
The controls are: debt (% GDP), GDP gap (as measured by HP filter), real GDP growth (current and one
lag), a dummy for an episode of fiscal consolidation in the previous year, long-term and short-term interest rates,
current account (% GDP), change in the investment to GDP ratio, real private loan growth, CPI inflation rate,
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As can be seen in figure 13, the results are, in general, in line with the estimations using the
AIPW method, the main di↵erences being the smaller coefficient for shocks larger than 1.5% of
GDP and the larger confidence interval for estimations of the shocks larger than 3% of GDP.
The e↵ects of the types of shocks are very similar to our baseline estimations.
Figure 13: Simpler DiD
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Note: Dots indicate estimated coefficients. The bars indicate a 95% confidence interval. Actual shocks are those
that took place in time t, expected or not.

4.7

“Cleaner” controls - A local projections approach to DiD

An increasingly recognized problem in studies that resort to some form of di↵erences-in-di↵erences
estimation is the bias that emerges once one moves away from a “2X2” setup - that is, two periods (pre and post-treatment) and two status (treated or never treated) (e.g.,Callaway and
Sant’Anna (2021), De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille (2020) and Goodman-Bacon (2021)).
In our case, one can illustrate an important potential bias by reminding that the regression
that estimates the e↵ect of an austerity shock in time t on output in time t + k has as controls
countries that also had shocks between t + 1 and t + k

1. In situations in which the treatment

e↵ects are heterogeneous and dynamic, as in our case, the bias is clear: the observations used
as controls are also under the influence of shocks.
There are di↵erent ways of trying to reduce this bias. The method suggested by Dube et
al. (2022) seems particularly interesting and adequate for our purposes given the endogenous
nature of the treatment time. In this subsection, we follow, their approach by excluding from
the control sample countries that were “treated” between t + 1 and t + k when estimating the
e↵ect of treatment in t on output at t + k.34 This is performed with our baseline setting (section
a cyclical component of GDP, country fixed e↵ects, two lags of change in GDP, and leads of shocks that occur
from time t up to time h.
34
For instance, assume several countries have austerity shocks in 1990. To calculate the average e↵ect of these
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3), that is, on top of performing propensity-score matching and controlling for future shocks of
the treated countries.
Although this approach has the advantage of providing control units that are not under the
influence of austerity, it comes with the relatively high cost of significantly decreasing the number
of observations for each estimation. This might lead to a less smooth sequence of coefficients
and a wider confidence interval. In our case, the smaller the threshold for the minimum shock
size, the stricter the rule on controls will be.35 We focus, therefore, on the higher threshold
of shocks larger than 3% of GDP so that we can have an adequate number of observations.
Results for both GDP and capital stock are displayed in figure 14. As can be seen, even in this
much stricter scenario, results persist, indicating significant negative e↵ects of austerity shocks
over long periods.
Figure 14: Cleaner controls - Shocks larger than 3% of GDP
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Note: Dots indicate estimated coefficients. The bars indicate a 90% confidence interval.
episodes after 10 years, the control sample will consist only of countries that did not have an episode between
1990 and 2000. Similarly, to calculate the e↵ects after 5 years, the control sample would consist of countries that
did not experience an episode between 1990 and 1995.
35
That is, for a smaller threshold, we have a larger number of shocks, and thus the number of countries that
can be used as controls in a 15-years window is very reduced.
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4.8

Expansions

The goal of this paper is to analyze the long-run e↵ects of austerity shocks. However, di↵erently
from the existing literature, by focusing on the actual negative fiscal shocks and not assuming
that positive shocks are symmetrical, we can also perform an initial assessment of the e↵ects of
expansionary fiscal measures. These shocks are much rarer in the existing narrative datasets,
amounting to only nine cases in our baseline one (Alesina, Favero, et al. (2019a)), and, therefore,
these results must be interpreted with all the due caveats and should be seen only as a first
approximation to the issue.
Using the same regression as in section 3 and both our baseline dataset (figure 15) and its
extended version (figure 16), we find that expansionary shocks tend to have positive long run
e↵ects on GDP.
Figure 15: E↵ect of fiscal expansions - baseline

GDP (log points)

6

4

2

0
0

5

10

15

Years after shock
Size of shock (%GDP)
>0%

Note: Dots indicate estimated coefficients. The bars indicate a 95% confidence interval.

30

Figure 16: E↵ect of fiscal expansions - extended dataset
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5

Conclusion

After a time of diminished interest in fiscal policy during the so-called Great Moderation in
advanced economies, the past two decades saw an emerging interest in fiscal research, deriving
from the challenges most economies faced since the Global Financial Crisis. Despite several
e↵orts, which greatly improved our knowledge about the topic, a few important gaps persist.
This paper aimed at addressing one in particular: the long-run e↵ects of austerity policies.
The idea that countries are still being a↵ected by the most recent austerity wave that followed
the financial crisis is widespread in public opinion. This impression might have encouraged the
emergence of a literature that links austerity with several e↵ects, including those that tend
to have persistent impacts, from public health, to political instability and democracy erosion
(e.g., Fetzer (2019), Baccaro et al. (2021), Ponticelli and Voth (2020), Guriev and Papaioannou
(2022)), Rajmil et al. (2020)). Regarding its economic impact, however, the evidence is limited
to short-run e↵ects focused, in general, to a maximum of five years, even on its more aggregated
level, such as output or capital stock.
Employing a method that ‘re-randomize’ the allocation of austerity episodes in a local pro-
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jections setup and accounting for the fact that multiple shocks occur in the time horizon of
interest, our results indicate that relatively large austerity measures have detrimental e↵ects
on GDP even after 15 years. This result is robust to extensions in the fiscal shocks used as
controls, to di↵erent measures of GDP, to alternative narrative datasets, to the exclusion of
individual shocks and countries, to the implementation of simpler regression methods, to the
use of ‘cleaner’ controls, and to a di↵erent definition of shocks (only actual shocks). Moreover,
there is robust evidence that austerity shocks have significant negative e↵ects on capital stock.
There is also some indication, although less robust, of negative e↵ects on the labor market and
that spending cuts are more detrimental to GDP than tax increases.
This paper fills a relevant gap in the literature by: (i) examining the long-run e↵ects of fiscal
policy, employing techniques that are appropriate for such estimations; (ii) focusing exclusively
on contractions and not assuming symmetry with expansions; (iii) allowing di↵erent e↵ects for
di↵erent shock sizes, both in proportional terms and related to its persistence over time. These
two last points are particularly relevant as the term ‘austerity’ is of public interest and it seems
important that economists engage in the broader conversation with a similar understanding
of the term: contractionary fiscal policy of significant size. Arguing, a priori, that standard
fiscal multipliers are sufficient to assess the impact of austerity episodes is misleading, do not
contribute to our understanding of the topic and is not very useful for policy orientation. Finally,
when it comes to the time horizon of the estimation, our study contributes to the growing
literature on the persistent e↵ects of demand shocks by being the first to analyze the the longrun impact of fiscal shocks. In this context, our estimations present additional evidence that
demand shocks may have significant long-run e↵ects.
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Jordà, Ò. (2005). “Estimation and inference of impulse responses by local projections”. In:
American Economic Review 95.1, pp. 161–182.
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Jordà, Ò. and Taylor, A. M. (2016). “The time for austerity: estimating the average treatment
e↵ect of fiscal policy”. In: The Economic Journal 126.590, pp. 219–255.
Li, D., Plagborg-Møller, M., and Wolf, C. K. (2022). Local projections vs. vars: Lessons from
thousands of dgps. Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Lucas Jr, R. E. (2003). “Macroeconomic priorities”. In: American economic review 93.1, pp. 1–
14.
Lunceford, J. K. and Davidian, M. (2004). “Stratification and weighting via the propensity score
in estimation of causal treatment e↵ects: a comparative study”. In: Statistics in medicine
23.19, pp. 2937–2960.
Martin, R., Munyan, T., and Wilson, B. A. (2015). “Potential output and recessions: are we
fooling ourselves?” In: FRB International Finance Discussion Paper 1145.
Mountford, A. and Uhlig, H. (2009). “What are the e↵ects of fiscal policy shocks?” In: Journal
of applied econometrics 24.6, pp. 960–992.
Ponticelli, J. and Voth, H.-J. (2020). “Austerity and anarchy: Budget cuts and social unrest in
Europe, 1919–2008”. In: Journal of Comparative Economics 48.1, pp. 1–19.
Rajmil, L. et al. (2020). “Austerity policy and child health in European countries: a systematic
literature review”. In: BMC public health 20.1, pp. 1–9.
Ramey, V. (2019). “Ten years after the financial crisis: What have we learned from the renaissance in fiscal research?” In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 33.2, pp. 89–114.
Ramey, V. and Shapiro, M. (1998). “Costly capital reallocation and the e↵ects of government spending”. In: Carnegie-Rochester conference series on public policy. Vol. 48. Elsevier,
pp. 145–194.
35

Ramey, V. A. (2011). “Identifying government spending shocks: It’s all in the timing”. In: The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 126.1, pp. 1–50.
Ramey, V. A. and Zubairy, S. (2018). “Government spending multipliers in good times and in
bad: evidence from US historical data”. In: Journal of Political Economy 126.2, pp. 850–901.
Reinhart, C. M. and Rogo↵, K. S. (2010). “Growth in a Time of Debt”. In: American economic
review 100.2, pp. 573–78.
Riera-Crichton, D., Vegh, C. A., and Vuletin, G. (2016). “Tax multipliers: Pitfalls in measurement and identification”. In: Journal of Monetary Economics 79, pp. 30–48.
Romer, C. and Romer, D. (2010). “The macroeconomic e↵ects of tax changes: estimates based
on a new measure of fiscal shocks”. In: American Economic Review 100.3, pp. 763–801.
Solow, R. M. (1956). “A contribution to the theory of economic growth”. In: The quarterly
journal of economics 70.1, pp. 65–94.
Summers, L. H. (1988). “Relative Wages, Efficiency Wages, and Keynesian Unemployment”. In:
The American Economic Review 78.2, pp. 383–388.
Teulings, C. and Zubanov, N. (2014). “Is economic recovery a myth? Robust estimation of
impulse responses”. In: Journal of Applied Econometrics 29.3, pp. 497–514.
Yellen, J. (2016). Macroeconomic Research After the Crisis: a speech at ”The Elusive ’Great’
Recovery: Causes and Implications for Future Business Cycle Dynamics” 60th annual economic conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, Massachusetts,
October 14, 2016. Tech. rep. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US).

36

6
6.1

Appendix
Pre-trends
Figure 17: Alesina - pre-trends
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In our baseline estimation, we follow the setting proposed by Jordà and Taylor (2016). Figure
17 indicates that pre-trends might be operating, which might indicate that, even reweighting the
sample, some di↵erences remain between treated and untreated units. As a robustness exercise,
we run the same estimation but control for one additional lag of GDP growth (in the ‘outcome’
model). Figure 18 indicates that this reduces significantly pre-trends within a 10-years window
(particularly for the shocks that we are most interested in) while the main results persist.
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Figure 18: Alesina - pre-trends
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Overlapping assumption

Some details on the data for the Alesina: Debt is the General Government Debt/GDP ratio
- IMF Historical Public Debt Database. CPI inflation rate (IMF) Short-term interest rate OECD Economic Outlook. Long-term interest rate: long-term interest rate on government
bonds - OECD Economic Outlook. Investment to GDP ratio based on Gross Fixed Formation
data (OECD Economic Outlook) and Gross domestic product, volume, market prices. Source
for all except IRL: OECD Economic Outlook n. 97. Source for IRL: IMF WEO April 2015.
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Figure 19: Alesina (all austerity cases)
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Extension

Using the OECD data for the capb (2) and PWT for GDP (1)
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Figure 20: Extension using IMF CAPB and PWT data for GDP - Alesina, Azzalini, et al.
(2018)
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Figure 21: Extension OECD CAPB - Alesina, Azzalini, et al. (2018)
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Figure 22: Baseline - Only actual shocks
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Figure 23: By type of shock - Only actual shocks
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Figure 24: Only actual shocks - Robustness - Size
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Figure 25: Only actual shocks - Robustness - Type
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Figure 26: Only actual shocks - By size of shock
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Di↵erent fixed e↵ects assumptions
Figure 27: Country and Time fixed e↵ects
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Note: Dots indicate estimated coefficients. The bars indicate a 95% confidence interval.
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15

E↵ects on the labor market
Figure 28: E↵ect by size - Unemployment rate - OECD data
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Figure 29: E↵ect by size - Long-run Unemployment rate - OECD data
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Figure 30: E↵ect by size - Labor force participation - OECD data
5

Change (%)

0

−5

−10
0

5

10

15

Years after shock
Size of shock (%GDP)
>0%

>3%

Multiplier
Figure 31: E↵ect of Austerity - Multiplier - Extended Dataset (CAPB)
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Note: Dots indicate estimated coefficients. The bars indicate a 90% confidence interval.
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Figure 32: E↵ect of Austerity - By size of the shock - Multiplier
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